InCognito

Thoughts on Lachmann, Determinism, and Free Will

2014-04-18

In "The Role of Expectations in Economics as a Social Science", Ludwig Lachmann remarks about determinism,
Does Professor Hicks seriously maintain that the same individual confronted with the same kind of change will invariably react in an identical-and incidentally, predictable-manner? Only such invariability of reaction would entitle us to use intensity of reaction as a criterion of classification. (74)
Lachmann is conflating uncertainty with a lack of determinism. If the future is uncertain that does not mean that the events contained therein cannot be predeterimined given an identical starting state at time t. Some readers might remember that I have before made reference to historical time, making a similar claim as Lachmann here. Upon further reflection, I believe that I might have been making the same error.

If the future is uncertain from the point of view of human consciousness, but predetermined, it implies that free will as we conceive it is an illusion. I'm still not sure what to make of this conclusion, maybe more on that in the future.